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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to review the district court's 
order awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 706(k) of 
Title VII to L.B. Foster Co. as the prevailing defendant in 
the Title VII action brought by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against that company. 
For the reasons explained below, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
L.B. Foster manufactures and sells rail construction and 
tubular products. In 1980, Jo Ann Wilson was hired in the 
company's Houston office. She was later promoted to credit 
manager. In 1986, following the reorganization of the 
company's credit department, Wilson relocated to Foster's 
headquarters in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
 
A year after her transfer to Pittsburgh, Wilson began 
expressing a desire to return to Houston. However, Wilson 
changed her mind after David Minor, the corporate credit 
manager, was promoted to Assistant Treasurer in December 
1987. Minor's promotion created a vacancy in his former 
position that Wilson was interested in filling. The corporate 
credit manager is responsible for the implementation of the 
company's credit policies and therefore had to possess the 
"ability to understand and . . . interpret financial and credit 
information, . . . correspond with customers and 
salespeople under difficult circumstances . . .[and had to 
have a] complete knowledge of uniform commercial codes, 
financing arrangements, commercial contracts, bankruptcy, 
international trade, bond and lien laws, and various credit 
instruments, [the] ability to manage as well as motivate 
subordinates and the ability to interact with management." 
App. at 565. 
 
In January 1988, Wilson approached Minor and 
expressed an interest in his old position. She was 
disappointed to learn that Minor was also considering 
Steven Hahn for the promotion. Hahn had also transferred 
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to the company's headquarters after the reorganization of 
its credit department, and, like Wilson, he was a regional 
credit manager in the Pittsburgh office. Minor supervised 
both Hahn and Wilson and, although he regularly 
interacted with both of them, he was more familiar with 
Hahn's work. Minor considered Hahn's management style 
very professional, his credit presentations well constructed, 
his financial analysis very strong, and his interactions with 
customers and sales representatives courteous and 
professional. 
 
Minor interviewed Wilson and Hahn for the position. 
During her interview, Wilson criticized Hahn and 
challenged Minor to identify her shortcomings. Minor had 
criticized Wilson's credit presentations on several prior 
occasions because information and documents had been 
missing. Minor was also critical of Wilson's long lunches 
and telephone mannerisms. Overall, however, Minor 
regarded Wilson as a valued employee. Wilson did not 
acknowledge any of these deficiencies in her interview. 
Instead, she only discussed problems she perceived in 
Hahn. Minor was generally disappointed by Wilson's 
interview and regarded her criticism of Hahn as 
unprofessional. 
 
After considering the qualifications of both candidates, 
Minor recommended that Hahn receive the promotion 
because Minor thought that Hahn's analytical, 
management, and interpersonal skills were superior to 
Wilson's. Minor also thought that Hahn had demonstrated 
greater dedication to the company. After Human Resources 
approved Minor's recommendation, Hahn was informed, 
and, two days later, Wilson resigned from her position and 
told Minor that she intended to file a sex discrimination 
suit against him and the company. However, Wilson 
apparently had second thoughts about doing so, and, the 
very next day, she told Minor that, while her resignation 
was still effective, she had changed her mind about suing. 
 
A few months after Wilson left the company, a 
representative of Johnston Pump and Valve Co., one of L.B. 
Foster's largest customers, called Minor and requested a 
job reference for Wilson. Minor had provided such 
references in the past, but he refused to provide the 
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requested reference for Wilson and instead referred the call 
to the personnel department. Personnel did not give Wilson 
a reference but merely furnished her dates of employment. 
Wilson did not receive a job offer from Johnston Pump. 
 
The EEOC brought a Title VII action against the L.B. 
Foster Co. in 1990 alleging that Wilson had not been 
promoted because of sexual discrimination. The complaint 
also alleged that the company had refused to provide the 
job reference for Wilson in retaliation for her threat to sue 
after she resigned. Wilson later intervened in the action and 
asserted similar claims. L.B. Foster Co. moved for summary 
judgment but that motion was denied, and the case 
proceeded to a bench trial in the district court. 
 
The EEOC presented evidence suggesting that L.B. 
Foster's proffered explanation for giving Hahn the 
promotion--that he was better qualified--was pretextual. 
That presentation included evidence that Hahn had been 
criticized for deficiencies prior to his promotion to Minor's 
former position and that L.B. Foster had reassigned certain 
territories to Wilson because of those deficiencies. After the 
close of the EEOC's evidence, the company moved for 
judgment as a matter of law, but the court deferred ruling 
on that motion. The court, however, ultimately found in 
favor of L.B. Foster on both the failure-to-promote and 
retaliation claims and entered judgment for the company. 
Thereafter, the company moved for attorney's fees as the 
prevailing party under section 706(k) of Title VII. The court 
awarded the requested fees based upon its conclusion that 
the EEOC's action was meritless, frivolous, unreasonable 
and without foundation. Both parties agreed that, if Foster 
were entitled to any counsel fees, the reasonable amount of 
those fees would be $142,628.50. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment in that amount in favor of L.B. Foster. 
This appeal challenging only the court's determination that 
L.B. Foster was entitled to any attorney's fees followed. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331, 1345. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
This Court reviews a district court's award of attorney's 
fees for abuse of discretion. See Washington v. Philadelphia 
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County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 
1996); Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274 
(3d Cir. 1990). "We must defer to the district court's fee 
determination unless it has erred legally, or the facts on 
which the determination rests are clearly erroneous." 
Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 
1991)(citations omitted). The EEOC contends that the 
district court erred in finding that its suit was"frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation" and awarding 
attorney's fees on that basis. 
 
III. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) provides: 
 
       In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the 
       court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 
       other than the Commission or the United States, a 
       reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part 
       of the costs, and the Commission and the United 
       States shall be liable for costs the same as a private 
       person. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k). The "prevailing party" can be either 
the plaintiff or the defendant. However, in Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme 
Court clarified that the standard for awarding attorney's 
fees to prevailing defendants is not the same as the 
standard for prevailing plaintiffs. 
 
       In Christiansburg, the Court recognized that while a 
       liberal fees standard should be used for those parties 
       whose suits Congress wished to encourage, and who 
       needed this encouragement to bring the suits, a 
       stricter standard was appropriate for defendants, who 
       needed no encouragement to defend suits against them 
       and who were not vindicating an important public 
       policy. 
 
Dorn's Transp., Inc. v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 799 
F.2d 45, 49 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an 
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render 
such an award unjust." Id. at 416-17 (internal quotations 
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omitted). The rationale for this rule is twofold. First, "the 
plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 
`a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.' " 
Id. at 418. Second, "when a district court awards counsel 
fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a 
violator of federal law." Id. 
 
These considerations are wholly absent when the 
prevailing party is a defendant, and, therefore, a higher 
standard applies. In Christiansburg Garment, the Court 
defined that standard as follows: 
 
       [A] district court may in its discretion award attorney's 
       fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon 
       a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, 
       unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not 
       brought in subjective bad faith.1 
 
Id. at 421. "[F]rivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation," in this context, implies "groundless . . . rather 
than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case." 
Id. "[I]t is important that a district court resist the 
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning 
by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately 
prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without 
foundation." Id. at 421-22. Such post hoc reasoning "would 
substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation 
and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the 
vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII." Id. at 
422. Thus, we have previously stated "It is clear from 
Christiansburg that attorney's fees [to a prevailing Title VII 
defendant] are not routine, but are to be only sparingly 
awarded." Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 503. 
 
Several courts of appeals have reversed fee awards to 
prevailing defendants in lawsuits brought by the EEOC 
where these guiding principles have been misapplied. See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 
1993); EEOC v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564 
(11th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Kenneth Balk & Assocs., Inc., 813 
F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
Ry. Co., 743 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984). But see EEOC v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The standard is the same when the Commission is the losing plaintiff. 
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Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982)(affirming 
award of attorney's fees to employer because the EEOC 
"fail[ed] to comply with both its enabling act and its 
regulations"). In contrast, "[c]ases where findings of 
`frivolity' have been sustained typically have been decided in 
the defendant's favor on a motion for summary judgment or 
a . . . motion for involuntary dismissal. In these cases, the 
plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence to support their 
claims. [On the other hand, i]n cases where the plaintiffs 
introduced evidence sufficient to support their claims, 
findings of frivolity typically do not stand." Sullivan v. 
School Bd., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)(citations 
omitted). 
 
In determining if an award of counsel fees to a Title VII 
defendant is appropriate, courts should consider several 
factors including "(1) whether the plaintiff established a 
prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; 
and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to 
trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits." Id.2 These 
factors are, however, guideposts, not hard and fast rules. 
"Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a 
case-by-case basis." Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189. 
 
Even though an inquiry into an award of attorney's fees 
to a Title VII defendant is individualized, specific examples 
of awards that have been reversed assist in illustrating the 
policy behind the rule enunciated in Christiansburg. EEOC 
v. Kenneth Balk & Assocs., 813 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1987) is 
one example. There, the EEOC filed a Title VII action on 
behalf of a former employee alleging that the employer, 
Kenneth Balk Associates ("KBA"), had discharged her on 
the basis of race. The case was tried for three days before 
being continued to permit the parties to conduct additional 
discovery. The court then heard more evidence and granted 
the parties time to file post-trial briefs and proposed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. But see Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir. 
1989)("Cases that are ultimately viewed as frivolous may well survive 
motions to dismiss under a system of notice pleading that does not 
require factual detail and even motions for summary judgment in which 
the evidence may be presented in sketchy fashion and credibility may 
not be taken into account."). 
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 findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ultimately, 
judgment was entered in favor of KBA; the court awarded 
counsel fees; and the EEOC appealed. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the 
district court had misapplied the Christiansburg standard. 
The procedural history of the case suggested that the 
EEOC's claim was not baseless as KBA neither sought a 
pretrial dismissal nor moved for summary judgment or a 
directed verdict. In addition, the district court had 
permitted the parties to file post-trial briefs and proposed 
factual and legal conclusions. Furthermore, the district 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law disclosed 
that the court's ruling was based upon its credibility 
determinations. See id. at 198. Thus, the record suggested 
that the EEOC had some basis for its claim, and the court 
of appeals reversed the award of counsel fees. See id. In 
doing so, the court stated "[h]owever unpersuasive the 
EEOC's evidence ultimately proved to be, this evidence 
provided `some basis' for the EEOC's claim. Accordingly, the 
district court misapplied the Christiansburg standard . . . ." 
Id.; see also Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 290 (concluding 
that the "district court failed to exercise its discretion 
within the permissible bounds of 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) 
and within the requirements of Christianburg in awarding 
fees on the ground that the EEOC presented no credible 
evidence of discriminatory conduct"). 
 
IV. 
 
Here, the EEOC alleged sex discrimination and illegal 
retaliation against Wilson. We consider in turn the findings 
the district court made with respect to each allegation to 
determine whether those claims were "frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." 
 
A. Sex Discrimination Claim 
 
The EEOC presented a classic pretext-based case of sex 
discrimination. Wilson was obviously a member of a 
protected class; she applied for a promotion for which she 
was qualified; and the promotion went to a male. The 
district court correctly concluded that these allegations 
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made out a prima facie case on behalf of Wilson. See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973). The EEOC then presented evidence that L.B. 
Foster's proffered non-discriminatory explanation for its 
decision to promote Hahn, the male applicant, over Wilson 
was a fabrication. This included evidence "that Wilson had 
greater management experience, that Wilson was assigned 
a broader range of job duties, that Hahn had problems in 
performing his job, and that Wilson, on occasion, had to 
assist Hahn with his accounts." Appellant Br. at 17. 
Clearly, a reasonable fact finder could conclude from this 
evidence that L.B. Foster discriminated against Wilson on 
the basis of sex. See Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 
990 (3d Cir. 1997)("The inference [of pretext], along with the 
components of the plaintiff 's prima facie case, allow a jury 
to conclude that the employer was actually motivated by 
illegal bias . . . ."); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1996)(same), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997). 
 
It can hardly be said that the EEOC's claim was frivolous 
merely because the court (sitting as the fact finder) rejected 
the EEOC's evidence.3 See app. at 584 ("Wilson has not 
established her burden of proving pretext under Hicks that 
the company's articulated reasons for not promoting her 
are false and that sex discrimination was the real reason."). 
On the contrary, the EEOC's proof, if credited, would have 
been sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the EEOC. 
Accordingly, we cannot agree that the claim was frivolous 
or without foundation. See Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court's conclusion that "the evidence clearly and 
convincingly established that there was no sexual discrimination 
involved in Foster's [decision]" suggests that it was persuaded by 
Foster's 
evidence that Minor had promoted and retained a number of female 
employees. However, such evidence is not necessarily relevant to whether 
the company discriminated against Wilson. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978)(a racially balanced work force "cannot 
immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination"); 
Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1318 (8th Cir. 1983)("Merely because 
other members of a protected class . . . were recommended [for position 
denied the plaintiff] does not demonstrate an absence of 
discrimination."). 
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290 ("The district court failed to exercise its discretion . . . 
within the requirements of Christianburg in awarding fees 
on the ground that the EEOC presented no credible 
evidence of discriminatory conduct." (emphasis added)). 
 
Here, it appears that the district court "failed to heed the 
Supreme Court's warning in Christiansburg against the 
`temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding 
that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his 
action must have been unreasonable or without 
foundation.' " Id. at 290 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. 
at 421-22). "Assessing fees against the EEOC simply 
because it did not prevail undercuts the Congressional 
effort `to promote the vigorous enforcement of the 
provisions of Title VII.' " Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d at 290 
(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422). Accordingly, the 
district court abused its discretion in awarding L.B. Foster 
its fees for defending against the substantive claim under 
Title VII. 
 
B. Retaliation Claim 
 
The EEOC's retaliation claim alleged that Minor refused 
to provide a reference for Wilson after she had informed 
him that she intended to file a discrimination claim. Wilson 
apparently "assumed that [she] would get a reference just 
like all of the other people who had been at Foster." App. at 
110. However, when Johnston Pump sought a reference for 
Wilson, Minor refused to provide one. See app. at 295. It is 
not disputed that L.B. Foster had routinely provided such 
references for others in the past. 
 
In his deposition, Minor testified that the reason he did 
not provide a reference for Wilson over the telephone was 
that Linda Terpenning, who worked in the personnel 
department, had instructed him to refer all such calls to 
her. See app. at 100, 152. At trial, however, Minor testified 
that his refusal had more to do with not wanting to hurt 
Wilson by giving her a negative reference: "I felt that I 
would only hurt Jo Ann by giving [Johnston Pump] a 
truthful reference. . . . I discussed it with human resources 
[ ] what would happen if someone called me because I didn't 
want to hurt Jo Ann. It was decided the best thing for me 
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to do would be to refer [requests] to the human resources 
area." App. at 295. Minor's testimony was directly 
contradicted by Terpenning: "Q: Did you ever direct Mr. 
Minor that reference calls should be directed to your 
attention, reference calls for Wilson? A: For Wilson, no." 
App. at 355 (Direct Examination of Terpenning). We have 
previously stated that a district court can consider an 
employer's inconsistent explanations for the adverse action 
it took in determining whether that employer discriminated 
against the plaintiff. See Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 
799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986). Inconsistencies are no less 
relevant in adjudicating a claim of illegal retaliation under 
Title VII. 
 
Minor also testified that, when Johnston Pump called, he 
did not believe that Wilson was still contemplatingfiling a 
discrimination charge: "Jo Ann told me when she came in 
the office the following Monday that she had decided that 
she would no longer pursue [a sex discrimination charge] 
and that was not a course of action she was taking. So, 
when the call came from Johnston Pump, there was no 
pending suit against L.B. Foster Company." App. at 293-94. 
The district court apparently credited that testimony. See 
app. at 589. However, Minor had taken notes in which he 
recorded "she was considering filing a [discrimination] 
charge." App. at 377. 
 
On this record, the district court concluded that Wilson 
had not established a prima facie case of retaliation 
because she had not presented evidence of an adverse 
employment action and, presumably on that basis, the 
district court concluded that the EEOC's retaliation claim 
was frivolous. We disagree. 
 
The district court improperly focused on the action of the 
prospective employer and not L.B. Foster in determining 
whether the EEOC had presented evidence of an adverse 
employment action. The district court concluded that 
"[t]here is no evidence that Foster's response to the 
telephone call from Johnston Pump negatively influenced 
Wilson's application for employment with Johnston Pump." 
App. at 588. However, that is not the proper test. 4 All that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. L.B. Foster argues that, "[i]n a case in which a plaintiff alleges 
denial 
of a reference is retaliatory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
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is required to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discrimination is proof (1) that the plaintiff engaged in 
protected activity, (2) that the employer took an adverse 
action against her, and (3) that a causal link exists between 
the protected activity and the employer's adverse action. 
Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 
1997). An employer who retaliates can not escape liability 
merely because the retaliation falls short of its intended 
result. 
 
Here, the EEOC clearly established a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discrimination. Wilson was engaged in protected 
activity when she informed Minor that she intended to file 
a sex discrimination charge. See Barber v. CSX Distribution 
Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995)(describing indicia of 
protected activity); Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 
899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)(same). Wilson's 
subsequent statement to Minor that she had changed her 
mind about filing a charge does not negate her earlier 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employer's denial of the reference caused an adverse employment 
action," specifically that the prospective employer would have hired the 
employee but for the absence of the reference. Appellee Br. at 34 (citing 
Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1538 (11th Cir. 
1990)). That contention is only true in circumstances--not present here 
--where the plaintiff brings a damages claim against her former 
employer. See id. at 2538 n.2 ("[I]n order to make out a damages claim 
against the former employer whose blacklisting has prevented the ex- 
employee from working elsewhere, the ex-employee would have to show 
that a particular employer would have hired him but for the retaliatory 
comments concerning his involvement in activity protected by Title VII." 
(emphasis added)). The issue of whether Johnston Pump would have 
hired Wilson is not at all relevant to whether L.B. Foster is liable for 
retaliatory discrimination. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, __ F.3d __, 1997 WL 
366013, at *3 (9th Cir. 1997)("There is little question that the 
dissemination of adverse employment references can constitute a 
violation of Title VII if motivated by discriminatory intent. Thus, it is 
beside the point that Lowery's dissemination of the negative job reference 
was not the reason Hashimoto did not get the job with the Army." 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)); Smith v. Secretary of Navy, 
659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981)("An illegal act of discrimination 
whether based on race or some other factor such as a motive of reprisal 
is a wrong in itself under Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong 
would warrant an award of [damages]."). 
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protected activity and does not preclude the EEOC from 
having established a prima facie case as to Minor's attempt 
to retaliate for the threat. Wilson's purported change of 
heart may have been relevant to the district court's 
ultimate determination that the EEOC's evidence was not 
sufficient to prevail on that claim, but it does not establish 
that the claim itself was frivolous or unfounded. 
 
The EEOC presented evidence that Minor had personally 
given telephone references to prospective employers when 
they called about former employees, and these references 
went beyond merely providing dates of employment. App. at 
293. In fact, such telephone references seemed a matter of 
course until Johnston Pump sought one for Wilson.5 
 
In addition Wilson's protected activity and Minor's refusal 
to provide a reference are sufficiently close together to allow 
a reasonable fact finder to find the required element of 
causation. See Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177 ("Cases in which 
the required causal link has been at issue have often 
focused on the temporal proximity between the employee's 
protected activity and the adverse employment action, 
because this is an obvious method by which a plaintiff can 
proffer circumstantial evidence `sufficient to raise the 
inference that her protected activity was the likely reason 
for the adverse action.' "). 
 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that"[b]ecause 
Foster provided a telephone reference which confirmed 
Wilson's dates of employment, and it is undisputed that 
Minor would have given Wilson a poor recommendation due 
to the circumstances under which she left, plaintiffs have 
not established that Foster took adverse action against 
Wilson." App. at 588. However, given the inconsistencies in 
Minor's testimony, the company's conduct on behalf of 
other employees, and the temporal proximity of Wilson's 
threat and Minor's refusal to provide a reference, the 
EEOC's allegation of illegal retaliation is clearly not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The district court found that Minor provided such references for only 
two types of employees, those who had previously informed Minor that 
they had given his name as a reference and those employees who had 
been laid off in 1986. App. at 577. Minor's own testimony, however, does 
not suggest these limits. See app. at 293. 
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frivolous. See Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 
618-19 (3d Cir. 1989)("[A] wide panoply of adverse 
employment actions may be the basis of employment 
discrimination suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
. . . ."). 
 
We offer no opinion on whether this evidence was 
sufficient to carry the day but merely point out that it was 
enough to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discrimination. Accordingly, we conclude that there was 
some factual basis for the EEOC's retaliation claim, and the 
district court therefore abused its discretion in awarding 
L.B. Foster its fees on that claim. See EEOC v. Reichhold 
Chems., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1572 (11th Cir. 
1993)(concluding that, where plaintiff met her initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discrimination, "[that claim was] not frivolous and the 
district court abused its discretion in awarding fees against 
the EEOC"). 
 
C. Request for Back Pay 
 
The district court's only explicit finding of frivolity related 
to the EEOC's request for back pay. See Addendum at 4. 
The EEOC contended that "Wilson was entitled to full back 
pay for the post-resignation period because she would not 
have left her job if not for the discriminatory denial of 
promotion."6 Appellant Br. at 26. The district court 
regarded this contention as frivolous since Wilson was not 
constructively discharged. See Addendum at 4 ("The 
EEOC's arguments that Wilson was entitled to back pay 
even though she was [not] constructively discharged were 
frivolous."). 
 
The constructive discharge rule to which the court was 
referring provides that "employees are entitled to awards 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Originally, the EEOC sought back pay "based solely on the difference 
between the amount that Wilson would have received had she been 
promoted and the amount that she made as regional credit manager." 
Appellant Br. at 26. It later amended its request to conform to Wilson's 
requested relief for the full amount she would have received as regional 
credit manager had she not resigned. See Appellant Br. at 26. 
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such as back pay past the date of resignation and 
reinstatement only if they were actually or constructively 
discharged from their employment." Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 
Schorr & Soliscohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1991), 
rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992). The rationale behind 
this rule is that " `society and the policies underlying Title 
VII will be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful 
discrimination is attacked within the context of existing 
employment relationships.' " Id. Courts of appeals "have 
been nearly unanimous in their application of the 
constructive discharge rule, whereby victorious Title VII 
plaintiffs who have left their employment with the 
defendant but who were not constructively discharged by 
the defendant are only entitled to a remedy covering the 
period during which the discrimination occurred up to the 
date of resignation." Id. at 306. However, one court of 
appeals has held that a back pay award is proper, whether 
or not the employer was constructively discharged, when 
the employee "end[s] his employment for reasons beyond 
his control, reasons which were causally linked to the 
[employer's] wrongful denial of a promotion." Wells v. North 
Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th 
Cir. 1983)(upholding back pay award to employee who 
terminated his stock-clerk position after he was wrongfully 
denied a promotion to sales clerk and his employer refused 
his request for lighter duties to accommodate a work- 
related back injury); see also Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage 
& Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa. 
1980)(rejecting notion that the back pay award to an 
employee discriminatorily denied a promotion on the basis 
of her gender should terminate on the date of her 
resignation)("The back pay award, therefore, must be based 
on the period running from the date she should have been 
promoted to manager to the date the store closed-- the 
period it can be assumed she would have held the job to 
which she was entitled."). 
 
This Court has not yet taken a position under the 
circumstances here where the claim of constructive 
discharge is absent. We have merely recognized that 
"[c]lassifying a termination as a constructive discharge 
rather than a voluntary quit has significant ramifications 
with respect to the scope of relief." Goss v. Exxon Office 
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Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984). Since we have 
not yet ruled on this precise issue and since one of our 
sister courts of appeals has ruled that back pay would be 
recoverable under the facts alleged by the EEOC, the 
district court's determination that the EEOC's request for 
back pay was frivolous cannot stand. 
 
V. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
district court's order dated June 20, 1996 granting L.B. 
Foster its attorney's fees. 
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